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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The initial parties to this action included plaintiff 
John Wagner Associates, dba Grabber Utah, and defendants 
Hercules, Inc. and Modulaire Industries, Inc. Prior to trial, 
defendant Modulaire Industries Inc. and plaintiff John Wagner 
Associates, dba Grabber Utah settled their disputes. Defendant 
Modulaire Industries Inc. is therefore not a party to this 
appeal. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah 
Supreme Court's Order of Transfer to the Court of Appeals, dated 
January 10, 1989. The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (j) , and has discre-
tion to transfer this appeal pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
This appeal is from an Order granting a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment filed by defendant-respondent Hercules wherein 
plaintiff-appellants John Wagner Associates' First Claim for 
Relief for mechanic's lien foreclosure was dismissed, and from a 
final Judgment following trial dismissing plaintiff-appellant 
John Wagner Associates' Second Claim for Relief for failure to 
obtain a payment bond. Both the Order and the final Judgment 
were issued by Judge Noel of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court correctly found that 
the placing of leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 
and 16 on the Navy's land by Hercules pursuant to its lease with 
Modulaire does not constitute the construction, addition to, 
alteration or repair of a building, structure, or improvement 
upon land as required by the Utah Contractors1 Bond statute, Utah 
Code Ann, § 14-2-1 et seg. (1986). 
2. Whether the district court correctly found that 
Hercules, by virtue of its placing of leased mobile office units 
constituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the Navy's land pursuant to its 
lease with Modulaire, is not subject to the provisions of the 
Utah Contractors' Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 ejt seg. 
(1986). 
3. Whether the district court correctly found that 
Hercules' use of the Navy's land constitutes an interest which is 
not sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 et. seg. (1974 and Supp. 1986) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The two determinative statutory provisions are set 
forth in Addendum A hereto. They are Utah's Mechanics' Lien 
statute, Utah Code Ann. 1f 14-2-1 et seg. (1986) and Utah's Con-
tractors' Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp. 
1986). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On December 5, 1985, plaintiff-appellant John Wagner 
Associates, d/b/a Grabber Utah (hereinafter referred to as 
"Wagner") recorded a Notice of Lien against an alleged interest 
of Hercules in the Navy's property with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et, sea. 
(R. 15-17). The lien arose out of the failure of a non-party 
subcontractor to pay Wagner for the supplying of materials used 
in completing the interiors of mobile office units owned by 
defendant Modulaire Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Modulaire") 
and used by defendant-respondent Hercules, Inc. (hereinafter 
referred to as "Hercules") pursuant to a lease and placed on land 
owned by the United States Government. (R. 15-17). Wagner sub-
sequently filed this action for breach of a joint-check agreement 
against defendant Modulaire, and for failure to obtain a payment 
bond under Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 ejt seq. and for foreclosure of 
the mechanic's lien against Hercules. (R. 2-11). (The contrac-
tual relationships are depicted in Addendum B hereto.) 
The parties submitted various motions for summary judg-
ment and memoranda in support thereof. On March 22, 1988, Judge 
Noel granted Hercules' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment with 
respect to Wagner's First Claim for Relief for mechanic's lien 
foreclosure. (R. 509-512). Judge Noel found that, since the 
interest of Hercules in the Navy's property was not alienable, 
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Hercules' interest was therefore insufficient to allow for 
attachment under the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. 
S 38-1-1 et seq. (R. 509-512) • In the same order Judge Noel 
denied Hercules' Motion for Summary Judgment and Hercules' 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning the Second Claim 
for Relief for failure to obtain a payment bond, concluding that 
the factual issues relating to the kind and nature of the 
improvements were reserved for trial. (R. 509-512). Judge Noel 
concluded that there existed genuine issues of material fact 
bearing on Wagner's Third Claim for Relief, joint-check agree-
ment, against defendant Modulaire. (R. 509-512). 
Prior to trial, Wagner and Modulaire entered into a 
Stipulation of Dismissal and an Order of Dismissal, settling all 
causes of action between them. (R. 619-621). 
Trial took place on July 12, 1988. The only cause of 
action remaining at trial was against Hercules for failure to 
obtain a payment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 ej: seq. 
(R. 640, p. 9). At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court 
found that Wagner had no cause of action against Hercules under 
Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986) for goods supplied by Wagner to a 
subcontractor of Modulaire for use in finishing the interiors of 
these leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 and 16. 
(R. 630-631). The trial court determined that the placing of 
these mobile office units leased from Modulaire on the Navy's 
land by Hercules did not constitute the construction, addition 
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to, alteration or repair of a building, structure or improvement 
upon land as required by § 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann, (1986). 
(R. 628). The trial court also determined that Hercules, by vir-
tue of its placing these leased mobile office units on the Navyfs 
land, was not subject to the provisions of S 14-2-1 (1986) and 
that Hercules therefore had no obligation to obtain a bond for 
the benefit of Wagner. (R. 628). Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law were entered by the trial court on August 24, 1988. 
(R. 623-629). 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Hercules is unwilling to accept Wagner's version of the 
Statement of the Facts because of their argumentative nature and 
because of the lack of cites to the Record. Hercules sets forth 
its Statement of the Facts as follows: 
1. Hercules produces missiles on land called the 
Bacchus Works, part of which is comprised of land owned by the 
United State Government and over which the Navy has jurisdiction, 
(R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640, p. 104). 
2. The Navy land is used by Hercules pursuant to an 
Award/Contract which allows Hercules to use the land without mak-
ing payment for its use so long as Hercules uses the land for 
work on government contracts. (R. 639, p. 31). 
3. Modulaire's Salt Lake City office has, either in 
storage at its facilities or placed at various locations in the 
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western United States, 461 mobile office units for lease as tem-
porary facilities for its customers. (R. 640, p. 90). 
4. On June 7, 1985, Hercules gave a Purchase Order to 
Modulaire under which Modulaire agreed to lease mobile office 
units to comprise two mobile office complexes, known as Annex 15 
and Annex 16, for Hercules1 use for a period of 24 months. 
(R. 640, p. 53, Exhibit 64). 
4. The Purchase Order included charges for disman-
tling and returning the leased mobile office units. (R. 218). 
5. Each mobile office unit is 14f x 60f; Annex 15 
consists of 19 units; Annex 16 consists of 11 units. (R. 640, 
p. 69-70, Exhibit 71) . 
6. The 30 units which comprise the mobile office com-
plexes were delivered by Modulaire to land owned by the United 
States Navy and used by Hercules pursuant to its Award/Contract 
with the Navy. (R. 234). 
7. When delivered by Modulaire to Hercules, the 
mobile units were finished exteriorly but did not have finished 
interiors. (R. 640, p. 75-76). 
8. Modulaire contracted with Space Building Systems 
to perform the interior finishing of the units using demountable 
partitioning. (R. 170, Exhibit 4). 
9. Space Building Systems awarded a contract to 
Wagner for materials used in completing the interiors of the 
units. (R. 443). 
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10. Hercules never contracted with Space Building Sys-
tems or with Wagner to perform work on the units. (R. 640, 
p. 105-106). 
11. On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed 
for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
(R. 443). 
12. Wagner was not paid in full by Space Building Sys-
tems before Space Building Systems was granted protection under 
the United States bankruptcy laws. (R. 443). 
13. Modulaire paid in full all sums due and owing to 
Space Building Systems for the work performed on the interiors of 
the trailers. (R. 171; R. 640, p. 12). 
14. Wagner made demand for payment from Modulaire and 
Hercules, and upon their refusal to make payment for the materi-
als, Wagner filed a Notice of Lien against an alleged interest of 
Hercules in the Navy's property with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et sea. (R. 443). 
15. Hercules began using Annex 15 and Annex 16 in Sep-
tember, 1985. (R. 640, p. 57). 
16. Hercules extended its lease of the two mobile 
office complexes to April, 1989. (R. 640, p. 57). 
17. The units are delivered by being towed on the open 
highway and, when at the site, are stabilized on gravel upon 
which a wooden pallet is placed and upon that several cinder 
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blocks to create a dry stack; channel beams which form the floor 
of the unit rest on the dry stack, (R. 235; R. 640, p. 113). 
18. Each unit has its own heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning unit and its own individual electrical panel 
which is fed from a main panel setup for the annex; each unit is 
entirely self contained. (R. 640, p. 70). 
19. Once stabilized on the cinder block piers, the 
wheels are removed and stored for future use in removing the 
mobile units from the site. (R. 235). 
20. The ceiling trusses and floor beams of units 
adjoined to form the annex are bolted together, but not welded 
together. (R. 640, p. 77). At the lines where units are joined 
together, commonly known as mod lines, a piece of metal is placed 
to hide the mod line on the exterior. (R. 640, p. 73, Exhibit 
71). Skirting is placed around the base of the annex to hide the 
cinder block piers. (R. 640, p. 113, Exhibit 86). Wooden steps 
are placed at the door of each unit to provide access. (R. 640, 
p. 112, Exhibit 84). The wooden steps are not attached or fixed 
to the ground. Id. 
21. The mobile units are in no way fixed to the 
ground. (R. 640, p. 112-115). 
22. When one of the units is manufactured at 
Modulaire's facilities, a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin is 
provided to the sales office which then applies to the State of 
Utah to license the mobile unit as a mobile home. The unit is 
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thereafter taxed to Modulaire as personal property. Each year 
when personal property taxes are paid to the county in which the 
trailer is located, the State of Utah issues a mobile home 
sticker, Modulaire obtains a license plate for each unit which 
is used when the unit is transported across the open highways. 
(R. 640, p. 82-87, Exhibits 118-122, 127-128). 
23. Modulaire pays personal property tax on each of 
the leased units to the State of Utah through the Department of 
Motor Vehicles. (R. 640, p. 84, Exhibits 118, 119). 
24. Hercules, either through its own crews or by the 
use of contractors other than Wagner, prepared the sites for 
Annexes 15 and 16 by bringing in electrical lines and sewer 
lines, and by preparing the earth, but without laying cement 
foundations. (R. 639, p. 11; R. 640, p. 119). 
25. Located near Annexes 15 and 16 were Annexes 9 and 
10 which also consisted of a complex of mobile office units 
bolted together, one supplied by Modulaire and the other supplied 
by another supplier. These annexes were removed from the Navy's 
property at the close of the lease on them. (R. 640, p. 114-120, 
Exhibits 69, 95-117). 
26. For removal, the skirting was removed, the metal 
strip along the mod line was removed, the bolts through the ceil-
ing trusses and between the floors of the various units were 
removed, each unit was jacked up, the cinder block dry stacks 
were removed, the wheels were placed back on the unit, a towing 
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tongue was placed on the unit, and the unit was removed to the 
central parking lot by a small tractor for pickup and removal 
from the site by a semi-tractor. (R. 640, p. 114-120, Exhibits 
95-117). 
27. Removal of the mobile office units comprising 
Annexes 15 and 16 at the close of the lease term would be done in 
substantially the same manner as the removal of Annexes 9 and 10. 
(R. 640, p. 120). 
28. The Navy's land could be used for a variety of 
purposes. (R. 640, p. 120-121). 
29. The Modulaire office units comprising Annexes 15 
and 16 are placed on the Navy's land temporarily. (R. 640, 
p. 54, 106-107). 
30. Hercules did not intend to place the buildings on 
the Navy's land permanently. (R. 640, p. 106-107). 
Hercules makes the following observations with respect 
to the facts as set forth by Wagner. The paragraphs numbered 
here correspond to Wagner's numbered paragraphs under the heading 
"Statement of Facts." 
1. Wagner did not supply "construction materials for 
the construction of approximately 25,000 square feet of office 
space". Wagner only supplied materials to finish the interior of 
mobile office units. (R. 443) . 
2. No office space was "constructed" with 30 modular 
office units. There was in fact no construction at all. 
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Hercules chose temporary mobile office units, as opposed to 
erecting a building, to satisfy its temporary needs for space. 
(R. 640, p. 107, 177). 
12. Hercules never entered into a contract with 
Modulaire "for the construction of certain office complexes on 
property". The contract between Hercules and Modulaire was for 
the lease of mobile office units. (R. 640, p. 69-70, Exhibit 
71). 
13. Modulaire never entered into a contract with Space 
Building Systems to provide labor and materials "in the construc-
tion and improvement of the office complexes." Modulaire con-
tracted with Space Building Systems to perform interior finishing 
in the mobile office units. (R. 170, Exhibit 4). 
24. Mr. Waring never testified regarding "the tenor" 
of Specification No. 9106. 
29. It is bizarre, to say the least, that Wagner would 
rely on the testimony of its attorney for the factual underpin-
ning for its claim. The only legitimate use made of the affida-
vit of Kurt Faux was to authenticate the photographs taken by him 
for use at trial to which Hercules did not object. 
33. The Award/Contract under which Hercules uses the 
property does not grant Hercules "wide-range use and control of 
all the 'facilities'". This statement is merely argumentative. 
34. Hercules did not spend "one-half million dollars 
for the office complexes". Hercules spent money to lease the 
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mobile office units from Modulaire for a limited duration of 
time; Hercules never paid for improvements to the property. (R. 
640, p. 53, Exhibit 64). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly found as a matter of fact 
after trial that the placing of leased mobile office units con-
stituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the Navy's land by Hercules pursu-
ant to its lease with Modulaire did not constitute the construc-
tion, addition to, alteration or repair of a building, structure, 
or improvement upon land as required by Utah's Bond statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 et sea. (1986), and, thus, as a matter of law 
that Hercules is not within the class of persons subject to the 
provisions of Utah's Bond statute, § 14-2-1 et. seer. (1986). 
Modulaire's trailers have not become part of the Navy's 
land by virtue of Hercules' contract with Modulaire. Materials 
become an integrated part of real property only when annexed to 
the land or made a part of some permanent structure on the land. 
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court discussed a tripartite test 
to be used in distinguishing between real and personal property 
for the purposes of establishing whether a conversion has 
occurred. The three factors articulated by the Court are: (1) 
The manner in which the item is annexed to realty; (2) Whether 
the item is adaptable to the particular use of the realty; and 
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(3) The intention of the annexor to make an item a permanent part 
of the realty. 
In the instant case, the mobile office units have not 
been "annexed" to the realty. The removability of the units was 
contemplated by the parties in the express terms of the lease. 
In fact, the evidence showed that trailers almost identical to 
the trailers in this litigation had already been removed from the 
premises. The subject trailers were easily removable by discon-
necting the pipes, reinstalling the wheels, and pulling them 
away, just as had been done previously with other trailers. They 
are, after all, nothing more than trailers. 
The Mueller court determined that an item is "adapt-
able" to the particular use of the realty when it is integrated 
into real property to further a specific purpose for which the 
real property has been devoted. The court stated, however, that 
personal property located on real property that is adaptable to 
multiple uses does not become "adapted" simply because the pres-
ence of the personal property determines the use of the real 
property at a particular time. In the instant case, the property 
was vacant and highly adaptable to multiple uses. Placing these 
trailers on the property did nothing to further any specific pur-
pose for which the property could be devoted. The trailers are 
used as temporary offices and do not have any special integration 
with the real property. The adaptation prong of the Mueller test 
has therefore not been met. 
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Another important prong of the Mueller test is whether 
the parties intended the property to be personal property or real 
property. In this case, the "intention" of the parties to retain 
the personal property characteristics of the units is strongly 
supported by the transaction documents• The written quote from 
Modulaire to Hercules was for mobile office units, specifying 
both setup and dismantling charges. In addition, each trailer is 
required to have a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin and to have 
a Motor Vehicle License under Utah law. Since each trailer is 
classified as a motor vehicle by the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, each unit is issued a license plate and a certificate of 
title, and is thereafter taxed as personal property,, None of the 
three requirements set forth by the Mueller court have been met 
in this case. 
The district court also correctly found that Hercules 
is not subject to Utah's Mechanics1 Lien statute. The remedy in 
a mechanic's lien action is for the court to sell the owner's 
interest in the property in order to satisfy the liens and the 
cost incurred by the lienholder. The threshold issue with 
respect to the lien statute is, therefore, the availability of an 
interest in land which can be judicially sold. Hercules has no 
interest in the Navy's land which could possibly be sold at a 
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale. Hercules uses the land 
without any lease, but pursuant to an Award/Contract. Hercules 
is allowed to use the land so long as it uses the land for work 
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on government contracts, Hercules does not own the land and it 
has no interest in the land to which a mechanic's lien could 
attach. Consequently, the district court correctly found as a 
matter of law that Hercules' interest in the land is not alien-
able and that it is not sufficient to be attached under the Utah 
Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann, S 38-1-1 et. seq. 
Even if Hercules were subject to the mechanics' lien 
statute as a matter of law, as a matter of fact the mobile office 
units were not annexed to the land and thus the requirements of 
the statute are not satisfied. This Court should therefore 
affirm both the district court's Order and its Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY WAGNER IN THIS APPEAL IS 
NOT AVAILABLE. 
The trial court's findings of fact were not clearly 
erroneous and its conclusions of law were completely correct. 
The lack of foundation for this appeal becomes apparent when the 
relief sought by Wagner from this Court is studied. 
The only issues pertaining to the bond statute relate 
to the legal determination made by the trial court that Hercules' 
having placed leased mobile office units comprising Annexes 15 
and 16 on the Navy's land did not constitute the construction, 
addition to, alteration or repair of a building, structure, or 
improvement upon land, and that Hercules is not a person subject 
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to the provisions of the bond statute. The trial court wanted to 
hear evidence regarding the placement of the mobile office units 
on the Navy's land so that it could make both the appropriate 
factual determination and the appropriate legal determination. 
There are two issues to be considered under the mechan-
ics1 lien statute. The first issue under the mechanics1 lien 
statute is one of law. Even if the facts were sufficient to sup-
port annexation of the mobile trailers onto the Navyfs land, 
nonetheless, as a matter of law the summary judgment must stand 
because Hercules has no interest in the property which can be 
foreclosed upon. The second issue is of a factual nature. 
Wagner would have this Court reverse the summary judgment granted 
Hercules by the trial court and "remand for further proceedings 
in the foreclosure of the Mechanic's Lien." (Brief, p.35). If 
the case were remanded, the only factual issues that could be 
determined would be those that have already been fully determined 
by the trial court after trial on the issues presented under the 
bond statute. Thus, if this Court sustains the trial court's 
factual findings with respect to the annexation issue under the 
bond statute, there would be absolutely no reason to remand this 
case on the mechanic's lien issue because the facts will automat-
ically have been found against Wagner's position. In other 
words, there is no remedy for Wagner under the mechanics' lien 
statute, as is discussed herein. 
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II 
THE STANDARDS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
ARE NOT IN DISPUTE. 
Utah's Mechanics1 Lien statute and Contractors' Bond 
statute are similar in nature, similar in language and identical 
in purpose. The mechanics' lien statute provides that persons 
furnishing materials used in the construction or improvement of 
any building, structure, or improvement to any premises shall 
have a lien on the property for which they furnish materials. A 
lien granted under this statute can only attach to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property. Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3 
et seq. (1974 and Supp. 1986). Similarly, the Contractors' Bond 
statute provides that the owner of any interest in land entering 
into a contract for the construction or improvement of any build-
ing, structure or improvement upon land shall obtain from the 
contractor a bond conditioned for the faithful performance of the 
contract and prompt payment for materials furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 et. seq. 
(1986). 
The parties agree that the statutes are read i_n pari 
materia and are applied equally and consistently to the same fact 
situation. The similarity between the mechanics' lien statute 
and the contractors' bond statute was noted long ago by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 
P.241 (1917), in which the court upheld the constitutionality of 
-17-
Utah's Bond statute. _Id. at 128, 167 P. at 246. Both of these 
statutes apply to (1) owners of an interest in land (2) for con-
struction, additions, alterations, or repairs to any building, 
structure, or improvement on the land. In Rio Grande Lumber Co., 
the Supreme Court noted that the Utah Bond statute "is auxiliary 
to our mechanic's lien law, and just as much in aid of it as if 
it had been made a part of it and incorporated in the same chap-
ter." Id. at 124, 167 P. at 245. 
The standard for review of the trial court's Findings 
of Fact is set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). It 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . . 
This Court has recently upheld this standard in Butler v. Lee, 
108 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987). In Walker, the 
Utah Supreme Court quoted Wright & Miller in defining that 
standard: 
The appellate court . . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without ade-
quate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
-18-
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alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land under the bond statute. But the bond statutes and the 
mechanics1 lien statutes are read jjx pari materia, Therefore, 
good guidelines exist in determining whether personal property 
has become annexed to real property. The trial court reserved 
the issue for trial so that, by reference to the statute, the 
court could determine whether Hercules was a person contracting 
for the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of any 
building, structure, or improvement upon land. 
Wagner suggests that Hercules should somehow be bound 
by the agreement between Modulaire and Space Building Systems. 
However, no party to this appeal was in fact a party to that 
contract and it is not at issue in this case. Furthermore, the 
fact that Modulairers agreement with Space Building Systems 
refers to Hercules as an "owner" is not sufficient to support a 
legal conclusion that Hercules is subject to the bond statute. 
Hercules is not subject to the statute, because the 
mobile office units have not been annexed to the Navy's land. In 
making that finding, the trial court dealt with the purely 
factual issue of whether the mobile office units had been annexed 
to the land. 
The trial court's finding that the mobile office units 
were never made part of the Navy's land is not clearly erroneous. 
In order to be within the class of persons included within the 
scope of the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statute, materials supplied for 
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and found that the equipment manufactured by Mueller and much of 
the equipment installed by Dahle constituted personal property 
rather than improvements to realty as required by the Utah 
Contractors1 Bond statute, Section 14-2-1r and the Utah Mechan-
ics' Lien statute, Section 38-1-4, and that Mueller and Dahle 
therefore held no statutory liens upon the equipment. In making 
its decision, the Mueller court discussed the tripartite test 
established in Heiselt Const, Co, v. Garff, 225 P.2d 720, 721 
(Utah 1950), in distinguishing between real and personal property 
for the purposes of establishing whether a conversion has 
occurred. 
The Mueller court accepted the Heiselt test, making the 
same real/personal property distinction for statutory lien 
purposes, 657 P.2d at 1283. The three factors articulated by 
the Utah Supreme Court are: "(1) [the] manner in which the item 
is annexed to realty; (2) whether the item is adaptable to the 
particular use of the realty; and (3) the intention of the 
annexor to make an item a permanent part of the realty." Id. at 
1283, Each factor, as well as other considerations, is discussed 
in more detail below, 
A. Manner Of Annexation, 
Addressing the annexation issue, the Mueller court 
found that, although the whey drying equipment was attached to 
the real property with ducts, wires, welding, and bolts, mere 
physical attachment did not necessarily mean that an item of 
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utilities for the offices complexes (i,et/ sewer, water, power) 
and those installing the concrete walkways and asphalt parking 
surface would likely have [a cause of action for] failure to 
obtain a bond and mechanic's lien claims.1' (Brief, p. 26). 
Indeed, given the facts of this case, there is no reason to 
believe that work by a contracting company would support such 
claims at all. In any event, whether those persons can make 
claims or not is of no importance in deciding the case before 
this Court. 
In the case at bar, the trailers are removable without 
extreme difficulty. Indeed, their removability was contemplated 
by the parties in the express terms of the lease. (R. 640, 
p. 53). Furthermore, trailers identical to the trailers in this 
litigation were removed from the premises not long before the 
trial. (R. 640, p. 120). The units were not placed on permanent 
foundations, but rather, they were placed on cinder blocks 
covered by a removable skirting. (R. 640, p. 113). Access to the 
units is provided through detached concrete stairs. (R. 640, 
p. 119, Exhibit 112). The utility hook-ups were provided by the 
lessee, were connected after delivery of the units, and are 
easily disconnected upon removal of the units. (R.> 640, p. 119, 
Exhibit 113). The subject trailers can be removed quite easily 
by disconnecting the pipes, reinstalling the wheels, and pulling 
them away, just as has been done previously with other trailers. 
(R. 640, p. 113). It certainly cannot be said that the trailers 
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TV V_**J U i.A U O -i-
• ; e s e r : e j .;- /*aoner 
c i c a : ;Q: ) a t r a r ; . :': - : . ; i : \ ; " , j 
j
"v :: a c t u a r y sounu m *. 
B. A d a p t a t i o n , 
D i s r j s ^ n ^ *!> a d a o t a t i * rono -*<z- t h e 
Muel jer • Tlie 
: c i *- * t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r r adap t ed" wner :* Is 
m r e q r a t e c -. ^ron^rt-v -' i>-*-~ ^ e c i i i c ,M: T ' *.<* f o r 
r e cnnr* -.
 kp * „ , t ly 
Xn.ed • * -j * o e r s o n a i p r o p e r t y . c r a - e d • - r o o e r t y 
a d a p t a b ! - mux u i.^  -i» doe - - 11J 1y 
. . z. P S e n r p ,.** pPTSCoid, p, iMf. . i e t t - n „ IHL, * ^e u s e 
ot :i^ r e a ! p r o p e r " ar - \ a ' o a r t i 'u i»- r ^ L*ll-.e"» a 
sys t em ~ : -^ m a 
fouT ' -s*-o. , ^ . -* t i j r i ^ a t e d meta- o n i u . n v : a c e ^ ; p ^ * e n e n t 
foundat ion *»* .-.-jinTppm-
 v-,c- -if*a~neri - * *- " l ing 
-^- * ; ^u; . * :^-J -j. p. len t 
10 .>tr j e r b o n d . or :pe ' *.**e : : vas r a n r i c a t e d -ir t d e s i q r . ^ a fo r 
remove * - --at- •> * ^ -^: - . * . • - • • . . . 
t I"] • . , < * . . . , ±
 t ^ ^ r: . .u i 'yOb^S S . . _e 
the equipm^"- was designed tor removal v:*-:-.)i, s.gr^ii_a:.t carnage 
to the bui- * 
I . instant case, vhe property vis vac a- *• L 1 ':'""/ 
adaptable r. . * *. ' - - - riacino — ^ ^ 
purpose for which the property could be devoted. The trailers 
were used as temporary offices and did not have any special 
integration with the real property. (R. 640, p. 54, 106-107). No 
damage is caused to the real property when the trailers are towed 
away. (R. 640r p. 119, Exhibit 113). Wagner suggests that 
removal of the office complexes damages the Navy's land, thereby 
suggesting that the land is useful for only one purpose. (Brief 
p. 31.) When the office complexes are removed, however, the 
Hercules parking lot simply is no longer bordered by the office 
complex but again is bordered by an open field which Hercules or 
the Navy will use as it sees fit. (R. 640, p. 114-120, Exhibits 
95-117). Thus, the supreme court's definition of adaptation has 
not been met, because the materials supplied by Wagner have 
neither become an integrated part of the real property nor a part 
of some permanent structure upon the land. The factual basis of 
the trial court's ruling in this regard thus certainly cannot be 
assailed. 
C. Intent. 
Another important factor to consider in determining 
whether the property is personal or real is the intention of the 
parties. According to the Mueller court: 
In order to qualify under these [mechanic's 
lien] statutes it is necessary that there 
must be an annexation to the land . . . and 
this must have been done with the intention 
of making [the personal property] a permanent 
part thereof. 
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conclusive evidence of the nature of the property, the lease 
could be "one of many items of evidence presented on the issue of 
respondent's intent." Id. at 1285. In the instant case, the 
transaction documents are strong evidence of the parties1 intent 
to retain the personal property characteristic of the units. 
Initially, Modulaire presented a written quote to Hercules for a 
modular office unit complex. The quote specified both setup and 
dismantling charges, evidencing an intent to remove the units at 
the expiration of the leases. (R. 218). The subsequent purchase 
order similarly included dismantling and return delivery charges. 
(R. 218). 
Wagner suggests that the mere fact that Hercules may 
choose to un-affix the office complexes in the future is somehow 
irrelevant in determining whether those units have been annexed 
to the land. (Brief p. 29.) In fact, that intention of 
Hercules, clearly expressed at the trial and totally 
uncontroverted at the trial, is a major element that the trial 
court had to and did consider in reaching its decision. 
The intent to retain the personal property characteris-
tic of the units is also evidenced by the temporary manner in 
which the trailers were actually placed on the property. To cre-
ate the temporary annex, a series of trailers was placed on cin-
der blocks and then held together only by bolts. (R. 640, p. 77). 
The trailers created the kind of structure that could hardly 
evince a desire for permanency. 
-28-
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permanently affixed when anchored to, and supported by, a perma-
nent foundation. Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-601(2) (Supp. 1987). 
Mobile homes are taxed as real property if (1) the mobile home is 
permanently affixed; (2) the owner of the mobile home and the 
real property to which the mobile home is affixed files an affi-
davit of affixture; and (3) the certificate of title or 
manufacturer's certificate of origin of the mobile home is sur-
rendered. Utah Code Ann. §S 59-2-602(1) - (3) and 59-2-603 
(Supp. 1987). Liens against a mobile home that has been con-
verted to real property must then be perfected in the manner pro-
vided for liens on real property. Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-602(5) 
(Supp. 1987). The trailers in the instant case, however, are 
still vehicles or mobile homes. They have not been converted to 
real property by the process set forth by statute. 
Wagner has relied on Thorp Finance Corp. v. F.M. 
Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (Utah 1965), claiming that 
wheel-less, motorless trailers are not motor vehicles under Utah 
law. This reliance is misplaced, since the nature of the struc-
tures in Thorp is distinguishable from that of the trailers in 
the instant case. The trailers in Thorp were transported by 
71
 independent wheeled dollies" _Id. at 268, 399 P. 2d at 207, and 
were "planted" for use as permanent duplex residences upon arriv-
ing at their destination. _ld. at 268, 399 P.2d at 207. Further-
more, the Thorp court held that the dealer transporting the 
structures was not required to register under Utah motor vehicle 
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Id, at S 80• Hercules obtained permission from the Navy to place 
the trailers on the Navy's property for 24 months. (R. 639, 
p. 31). Thus, the trial court was certainly correct in finding 
that the trailers did not become part of the Navy's property. 
Utah law is consistent with the general principle 
stated in the treatise. In Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033 (Utah 
1928), the court held that a three-room frame house on a cement 
foundation that extended approximately six inches above ground 
was the personal property of the builder, despite the fact that 
the deed conveying the real property to the adverse party did not 
reserve the house and that the adverse party "denied that he had 
any knowledge of the builder's interest in the house." _Id. at 
1036. According to the court: 
The rule seems to be well settled that, in 
the case of buildings or other improvements 
erected on another's land, if built with the 
consent of the landowner that they should 
remain the personal property of the builder, 
the agreement may be oral, for in such case 
the character of the building as personalty 
is fixed before attachment to the realty, and 
the agreement involved no sale of an interest 
in the land. . . . Under such circumstances, 
the building remains the property of the per-
son annexing it, and may be removed by him. 
Id. at 1035. 
The Workman facts are analogous to the facts in the 
instant case. Since the trailers were placed on the land with 
the consent of the landowner and under a specific agreement that 
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intended the building to be permanent and only considered its 
"flexibility" in the context of opening up parts of the building 
to accommodate different uses of the building on the property. 
657 P.2d at 1282, 1284. The parties never considered moving the 
building to another site. The trailers in the case at bar, how-
ever, were placed on cinder blocks, which placement was intended 
to be temporary. (R. 235; R. 640, p. 113). Indeed, the testimony 
at trial showed that identical trailers, placed on the same type 
of temporary cinder block bases, had recently been removed from 
the property and that the trailers in question forming Annexes 15 
and 16 were soon to be prepared for removal as well. (R. 640, 
p. 114-120, Exhibits 69, 95-117). Thus, the characteristics of 
the trailers and the metal building, as well as the intentions of 
the parties, differ significantly from Mueller to the instant 
case. 
Thus, the trial court properly found that under Utah 
law the mobile units were not fixtures but retained their charac-
ter as personal property. Even if Wagner supplied goods which 
were incorporated into these items of personal property, Hercules 
is not within the class of persons covered by Utah's Bond stat-
ute. The purpose and application of the bond statute are not 
jeopardized by the trial court's findings. The mechanics' lien 
statute and the bond statute will still protect laborers and 
materialmen and will still prevent the unjust enrichment of 
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unscrupulous property owners. See, Summary of Utah Real Property 
Law, Vol. II, at 484 (1978). 
Since the materials supplied by Wagner were not incor-
porated into permanent structures on real property in which 
Hercules could realize any benefit, for example from a salef 
there is no unjust enrichment to Hercules. The trailers were 
intended to be removed from the Navy's property at the end of the 
use period and added no value to the real property whatsoever. 
Wagner thus has no remedy under the bond statute. Any other con-
clusion would stretch that statute beyond the bounds intended by 
the legislature. 
IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
HERCULES IS NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH'S MECHANICS' 
LIEN STATUTES, UTAH CODE ANN. S 38-1-1 ET 
SEQ. 
This appeal raises two issues under the mechanics1 lien 
statute. The first is an issue of law, i.e., whether Hercules 
has a sufficient interest in the land to be attached. The second 
is an issue of fact, i.e., whether the mobile office units have 
become a part of the Navy's land. 
A. There Is No Interest In The Land On Which The 
Court Could Foreclose To Satisfy Wagner's 
Lien. 
The purpose of Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute is to 
prevent the owners of land from having their lands improved 
without having to pay the reasonable value for the materials and 
-35-
labor provided. Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Parkr Inc., 8 Utah 2d 
413, 416, 335 P.2d 837, 839 (1959); Rio Grande Lumber Co. , 50 
Utah at 127, 167 P. at 246. A mechanic's lien is a judicial 
mechanism to obtain for suppliers of goods or services payment 
for their labors and wares. The statute is not designed to 
provide an unpaid contractor with "leverage" to obtain payment 
through a threatened or actual suit for foreclosure. The ulti-
mate issue then with respect to the lien statute is the avail-
ability of judicial foreclosure on an interest in real property, 
because the remedy in a mechanic's lien action is for the court 
to sell the owner's interest in the property in order to satisfy 
the lien and the costs incurred by the lienholder. When a lien 
is claimed on property, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 provides that 
ff[t]he court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction 
of the liens and costs as in the case of foreclosure of 
mortgages. . . . " 
1. Hercules has no alienable interest in the land. 
The land on which the mobile office units are located 
is owned by the United States Government and is under the juris-
diction of the Navy. (R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640, 
p. 104). However, the United States Navy did not contract for 
the lease, placement, or finishing of the units. The government 
is not a party to the contract involved in this action, and 
Hercules is not acting on behalf of the United States. Further-
more, the mobile office units for which Wagner supplied materials 
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are not public buildings or public works within the scope of the 
Miller Act and therefore the Navy's land cannot be the subject of 
a lien and a subsequent sherifffs sale, or judicial sale, 
Hercules uses the land without any lease, but pursuant 
to an Award/Contract, (R. 639, p. 31), Hercules is allowed to 
use the land so long as it uses the land for work on government 
contracts, id. Hercules is not the owner of the land and it has 
no interest to which a mechanic1s lien could attach. Nor does it 
have an interest which could possibly be sold at a sheriff's sale 
or other judicial sale. 
Wagner asserts that, because Hercules in some unspeci-
fied agreement promised to keep the Navy's property free from 
encumbrances, it was thus proven that Hercules had an alienable 
interest in the property. (Brief, p. 17.) First, Wagner mis-
takes fact for inference. While reasonable inferences can be 
made from the facts presented, the inference suggested by Wagner 
is of no avail in this action. The reference is apparently to 
the agreement between Hercules and the Navy. Hercules' promise 
1
 In a related case, United States For The Use Of Idaho West-
ern, Inc. v. Modulaire Manufacturing and Hercules, Inc., filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Cen-
tral Division, the plaintiff was a party in the same position as 
Wagner, having contracted with Space Building Systems to supply 
materials for the same mobile office units, and having not been 
paid. In that case, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins dismissed the action 
with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, since the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Miller 
Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) et seg. 
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to avoid encumbrances on the Navy's land could more easily be 
understood to prohibit mortgages and other hypothecations than it 
could to be an admonition to avoid artesian1s and mechanic's 
liens, since the Navy is well protected in regard to the latter 
by the Miller act. 
Wagner also seems to assert that Hercules has unlimited 
use of the land, as if it had a rental agreement or lease. 
(Brief p. 17.) Nothing could be farther from the truth. The 
trial testimony shows with that Hercules is allowed to use the 
land only as long as it uses the land for work on government 
contracts. (R. 639, p. 31). 
Wagner asserts that, because there is no explicit 
reference to alienability expressed in the Award/Contract between 
Hercules and the Navy, Utah law must thus treat Hercules1 use of 
the land as an alienable interest in the land. It should be 
noted first that Wagner bears the burden of proof in this case. 
Rather than providing evidence to the lower court that there was 
no bar to alienability, which it might have done through an 
expert government witness, it has asked this Court to rely on the 
lack of evidence to support a proposition which needs 
affirmation. Secondly, it attempts to use the failure of 
Hercules to disprove a negative as a positive for his own case. 
Since Wagner has failed to provide the necessary showing of 
affirmative facts disputing the trial court's Finding of Fact, 
the trial court's Findings of Fact should be upheld. 
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All of Wagner's arguments miss the mark. The issue 
here is whether Hercules has an interest which can be alienated 
through judicial sale. The answer is that it has no such inter-
est in the Navyfs land. 
Wagner argues that Judge Noel's ruling would contravene 
the purpose of the mechanics1 lien and contractors1 bond statutes 
and would encourage owners of property to structure their deal-
ings in such a way as to avoid the applicability of the statutes. 
But Wagner fails to consider the remote possibility of any such 
widespread machinations occurring in the business world. First, 
making missiles for the United States government is an infre-
quent, even rare, business enterprise. Second, few of the 
companies making missiles for the United States government likely 
operate on government land. Third, of those missile-making 
companies operating on United States government land, very few 
likely operate in mobile office units. Finally, even fewer of 
those companies are likely to have situations involving subcon-
tractors who do not get paid for their work by a bankrupt con-
tractor and thus attempt to assert a mechanic's lien on the 
property. The argument is without merit. 
2. Hercules1 Interest In The Land Can In No Way 
Be Considered A Lease. 
It is clear from Utah law that Hercules1 interest can 
in no way be considered a lease. In its Brief, Wagner asserts 
that although neither Hercules nor the trial court term Hercules' 
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interest in the subject land as a lease under the Use Agreement, 
the law clearly does. Wagner states four factors that must exist 
for a valid lease: (1) A binding contract in compliance with the 
statute of fraud; (2) Possession by the tenant; (3) Legal title 
in the landlord; and (4) A leasehold that is capable of being 
granted. Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66 
(1978). Wagner asserts that all of these elements for a lease 
are satisfied in the present case. But Wagner fails to explain 
how they are satisfied. The record is clear, however, that at 
least the second factor, possession by the tenant, has not been 
satisfied. Hercules is using the Navyfs land pursuant to its 
Award/Contract, and has the right to use the land only so long as 
it uses it to work on government contracts. However, Hercules 
does not have legal possession of the land, which is necessary 
for a valid lease to exist. "The concept of where legal title 
remains is important in distinguishing a lease from other legal 
relationships. Likewise it is important in determining who has 
possession rights. For example, the landlord/tenant relationship 
is distinguished from the licensor-licensee relationship in that 
the licensee never gains exclusive possession of the land; he 
receives only permission to use it." Id. at 565, note 2. 
Hercules1 Use Agreement is just that, a use agreement, and 
Hercules clearly does not have "exclusive possession of the 
land." 
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The district court correctly found that Hercules1 
interest in the land is not alienable and that it is not suffi-
cient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics1 Lien statutes, 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et seq. No flood-gate scenario argues 
in favor of overturning the ruling. 
B. A Remand For Trial Under The Mechanics1 Lien 
Statute Would Avail Wagner Nothing. 
Wagner asks this Court to reverse its summary judgment 
order and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of 
the mechanic's lien. (Brief, p. 35.) However, if this issue 
were remanded, before Wagner could move forward with its foreclo-
sure action, it would have to show that the trailers were annexed 
to the land. The factual issues relating to the annexation of 
the trailers have already been fully determined by the trial 
court after trial on the issues presented under the bond statute. 
The trial court clearly determined that the trailers "are placed 
on the Navy's land temporarily and are not integrated into, 
affixed to, annexed to, or adapted to the Navy's land by 
Hercules." (R. 627-628). Therefore, if this Court affirms the 
trial court's Finding of Fact with respect to the annexation 
issue under the bond statute, there would be no reason to remand 
the issues dealing with the mechanic's lien because the facts 
will have already been determined against Wagner's position. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Modulaire trailers leased to Hercules were personal 
property and did not become part of the Navy's land by virtue of 
Hercules1 contract with Modulaire, Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's conclusion that the placing of these 
leased mobile office units constituting Annexes 15 and 16 on the 
Navy's land by Hercules pursuant to its lease with Modulaire did 
not constitute the construction, addition to, alteration or 
repair of a building, structure, or improvement upon land as 
required by Utah's Contractors' Bond statute, Section 14-2-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1986), and that it did not place Hercules within 
the class of persons subject to the provisions of Section 14-2-1, 
And this Court should affirm the trial court's Judgment dismiss-
ing with prejudice Wagner's Complaint. 
Hercules has no interest in the land to which a 
mechanic's lien would attach. Consequently, there is in this 
case no remedy under the mechanics' lien statute because there is 
no interest in the land which could possibly be sold at a 
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale. This Court should there-
fore affirm the district court's finding that Hercules' interest 
in the land is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be 
attached under Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. $ 
38-1-1, et, seg. , and this Court should affirm the district 
court's Order dismissing with prejudice Wagner's First Claim for 
Relief in its Complaint. 
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DATED this /^^dav of June, 1989. 
M. EbSGANTB-^  
MARK S. WEBBER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Hercules, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Annotated S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986) 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a con-
tract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition 
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improve-
ment upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material fur-
nished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed under 
the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other per-
sons as their interest may appear. Any person who has furnished 
or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor for or 
upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which pay-
ment has not been made, has a direct right of action against the 
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the rented 
materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished, or for labor performed, not exceeding the 
prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the 
work provided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, 
upon request. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation 
of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to 
exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable 
to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials 
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case 
the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability 
shall be commenced within one year from the last date the last 
materials were furnished or the labor performed. 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen -
Attorney's fee. 
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
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14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees. 
Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a 
mortgage or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to 
obtain the bond described in § 14-2-lf or imposes any liability 
upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained 
such a bond. 
Utah Code Annotated S 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp. 1986) 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on 
ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any man-
ner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like pro-
fessional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials 
or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the prop-
erty, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included within the 
lease. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Contractual Relationships Between The 
Parties Involved In This Action 
MODULAIRE •* HERCULES 
(Modulaire contracted with Space 
Building Systems to finish the 
interior of the trailers using 
demountable partitioning.) 
i 
(Hercules leased the 
the trailers from 
Modulaire,) 
SPACE BUILDING SYSTEMS 
(Space Building Systems 
contracted with Wagner to 
supply materials used in 
finishing the interiors of 
the trailers.) 
JOHN WAGNER ASSOCIATES, 
D/B/A GRABBER UTAH 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
HERCULES, INC. to the following on this /^J^day of June, 1989: 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
Walstad & Babcock, P.C. 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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